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BOOK REVIEWS
REPORTING ON A REPORTER
VIRGINIA CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS. Edited by W. Hamilton Bryson.
Richmond, Va.: The Dietz Press, Inc., 1985. $38.65 per volume.
Reviewed by T. S. Ellis, III*
Jesse Root. Nathaniel Chipman. George Caines. Ephraim Kirby.
Most lawyers will not recognize these names. More familiar, per-
haps, are Alexander Dallas, Henry Wheaton, and Richard Peters.
In fact, all belong to the same distinguished group: compilers and
reporters of America's early judicial decisions.1 With the publica-,
tion of Volumes One and Two of the Virginia Circuit Court Opin-
ions (hereinafter "Opinions"), Professor Hamilton Bryson bids fair
to join this distinguished group.2
Accurate, readily available reports of judicial decisions are vital
to an effective common law system. The genius of this system is its
ability to achieve and sustain a happy marriage between a fidelity
* Partner, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; B.S.E., 1961, Princeton University;
J.D., 1969, Harvard University; Dip. L., 1970, Oxford University.
1. Jesse Root (1736-1822) was a Connecticut lawyer who, in 1798, became Chief Justice of
that state's Supreme Court of Errors and published his REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT AND SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS FRoM JULY, 1769 to JUNE, 1793.
Nathaniel Chipman (1752-1843) was the first lawyer to serve as a justice of Vermont's
Supreme Court and in 1793 published his REPORTS & DISSERTATIONS, consisting chiefly of
reports of cases before that court.
George Caines (1771-1825) was New York's first official reporter and was responsible for
the publication of several compilations of reports, including NEw YORK TERM REPORTS OF
CASES ARGUED AND DsnnmiNE_ IN TisHE SuPREME COURT OF THAT STATE (1800-1806).
Ephraim Kirby (1757-1804) published the first complete volume of law reports in the
United States. See REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT FROM THE YEAR 1785 to MAY, 1788 wrrH Soim DETERMINATIONS (1798).
Messrs. Dallas, Wheaton and Peters are more familiar to lawyers because their names,
along with those of Cranch, Howard and Black, are inscribed on the spines of the United
States Supreme Court Reports for the period 1790 to 1874. William T. Otto's name appears
on the spines of volumes 91 U.S. to 107 U.S., covering the period from the October term
1874 through the October term 1882. Thereafter the Supreme Court reports ceased to bear
the names of the reporters.
2. Hamilton Bryson is a Professor of Law at the University of Richmond, T.C. Williams
School of Law. Volume Three is expected to be published by the end of 1985.
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to the past, through the doctrine of stare decisis, and a dynamism
necessary to accommodate the present and anticipate the future.
Reports of judicial opinions are the life-blood of this genius. Legal
scholars and practitioners have long recognized that publishing ju-
dicial opinions plays an important role in promoting uniformity,
preventing arbitrariness, improving judicial decisions and guiding
future conduct; all of which, taken together, improve the quality of
justice. These goals (hereinafter "the reporter's goals") could not
be achieved without reports of judicial decisions; indeed, without
them there could be no common law.' This review, therefore, con-
siders the extent to which Professor Bryson's Opinions furthers
the reporter's goals. Let us begin by describing the contents of
Opinions.
Opinions currently consists of two volumes. They contain 234
circuit court opinions-114 in Volume One and 120 in Volume
Two. Thirty-two different courts are represented, but the geo-
graphical distribution is skewed. Inescapably perhaps, over seventy
percent of the opinions are from courts in the Richmond area.4
This geographical imbalance, we are told, is due to proximity or
3. For an early discussion of the importance of reporting judicial decisions in achieving
the reporter's goals, see Paine, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Circuit
Court of the United States, for the Second Circuit, Comprising the Districts of New York,
Connecticut and Vermont, 27 N. AM. REv. 167, 179-81 (1828); Rickering, Reports of Cases
Argued and Determined in the Superior Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 20 N. A. REv.
180, 180-91 (1825).
William Cranch, an early U.S. Supreme Court reporter, used the prefaces to his reports to
acknowledge the importance of reporting decisions. My favorite appears in his first volume.
There, after noting that law reports eliminated uncertainty and promoted uniformity, Mr.
Cranch shined a bright light on the role of law reports in limiting judicial power
In a government which is emphatically styled a government of laws, the least possi-
ble range ought to be left for the discretion of the judge. Whatever tends to render
the laws certain, equally tends to limit that discretion; and perhaps nothing conduces
more to that object than the publication of reports. Every case decided is a check
upon the judge. He cannot decide a similar case differently, without strong reasons,
which, for his own justification, he will wish to make public. The avenues to corrup-
tion are thus obstructed ....
5 U.S. (I Cranch) at iii-iv (1801).
4. The geographical distribution is as follows:
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"physical convenience .. .to the reporter."5 It is also doubtless
true that the types of cases likely to prompt written opin-
ions-ones that are large, complex or address novel issues-find
their way more often into the circuit courts of larger cities.6 None-
theless, Professor Bryson is correct to seek greater geographic di-
versity, for judges of exceptional ability and cases of substantial
interest and complexity can be found throughout Virginia.
Professor Bryson has been somewhat more successful in achiev-
ing an appropriate measure of substantive diversity. Included in
the two volumes are decisions on contracts, personal injury, medi-
cal malpractice, procedure, worker's compensation, discovery, real
property and more. The criteria he used in selecting opinions were
essentially as follows:
(1) opinions that furnish authority where none now exists;
(2) opinions on discovery and civil procedure points;
(3) opinions on the Commercial Code; and
Volume 1:
Fairfax County
Princess Anne County
City of Richmond
Henrico County
Pulaski County
City of Roanoke
Accomack County
Campbell County
Henry County
Volume 2:
City of Roanoke
City of Richmond
Henrico County
Nelson County
Bedford County
City of Lynchburg
City of Alexandria
City of Virginia Beach
Russell County
Amherst County
5. 1 Va. Cir. preface (1985).
No.
Opinions
4
1
68
16
2
9
1
1
1
No.
Opinions
5
61
24
2
3
3
2
1
2
1
Hanover County
Prince William County
Pittsylvania County
Rockingham County
Warren County
Shenandoah County
Montgomery County
City of Virginia Beach
City of Charlottesville
Campbell County
Warren County
Wise County
City of Winchester
City of South Norfolk
Rappahannock County
Clarke County
Frederick County
Arlington County
Shenandoah County
No.
Opinions
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
No.
Opinions
3
2
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
6. But noticeably absent from either volume is any appreciable number of opinions from
urban areas other than Richmond, such as Norfolk, Alexandria, Arlington and Fairfax, or
indeed even Chesterfield County.
1985]
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(4) opinions that provide more recent authority on points covered
only in nineteenth century Virginia Supreme Court cases.7
Professor Bryson tells us that within these four categories he
sought opinions that emphasize legal rather than factual analysis,
yet contain sufficient facts to be comprehensible without resorting
to other sources.
It is worth dwelling a bit on Professor Bryson's four criteria as
they are at the heart of a reporter's task. The merit of the selection
criteria and the extent to which they are observed determine
whether, and in what measure, Opinions furthers the reporter's
goals, listed previously, of promoting uniformity, preventing arbi-
trariness, providing guidance for future conduct and improving the
quality of judicial decisions.
The first of the selection criteria is undeniably correct and al-
most certainly the most important. The law's expanse is too vast
and human conduct too infinitely diverse to permit the Virginia
Supreme Court and the intermediate appellate court to elucidate
all areas of the law. Lacunae exist. They always will. Circuit courts,
however, not infrequently decide issues within these lacunae. Pub-
lication of these decisions helps minimize uncertainty in the law,
provides some guidance for the future and serves other judges as a
check and a beacon.8 Uniformity in the application of law is also
promoted. A published circuit court opinion on a novel point is
available for the next circuit judge to follow or depart from in an
opinion, preferably written, which gives cogent reasons for doing
so. Thus it is apparent, as the early reporters recognized, that re-
porting decisions on points not previously settled is at the center
of a reporter's task; it is, without exaggeration, his principal raison
d'etre.
Not surprisingly, careful scrutiny of the second and third selec-
tion criteria reveals that these are actually subsets or specific ap-
plications of the first criterion. Professor Bryson correctly recog-
7. 1 Va. Cir. preface (1985).
8. For a particularly picturesque metaphor on this point, we are indebted to a British
commentator who wrote that judges in a common law system proceed "from case to case,
like the ancient Mediterranean marines, hugging the coast from point to point and avoiding
the dangers of the open sea of system and science." Wright, The Study of Law, 54 LAW Q.
REv. 185, 186 (1938). Dr. Johnson, typically more direct, wrote that "the more precedents
there are, the less occasion there is for law; that is to say, the less occasion there is for
investigating principles." J. BoswELL, 1 THE Lnn OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 615 (Everyman's ed.
1906).
884 [Vol. 19:881
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nizes that some areas of procedure and discovery rarely rise to the
appellate level.' In this respect, then, his Opinions serve, consis-
tent with the first criterion, much like a Virginia version of the
Federal Rules Decisions or Federal Supplement reporters. 10
The focus on Commercial Code opinions fits within the first cri-
terion for a slightly different reason. While there are no special ob-
stacles in the way of appealing Commercial Code cases, the Code is
an extensive statute, a vast legal landscape, of relatively recent
vintage. The legal lacunae, at least in Virginia, are large and nu-
merous. Put another way, the Commercial Code is fertile ground
for finding circuit court opinions on points not yet addressed by
the supreme court. Thus, Professor Bryson's focus on the Commer-
cial Code is simply a specific application of his first criterion.
Other similarly appropriate specific applications come to mind:
opinions dealing with the Virginia Tort Claims Act,"' the Equitable
Distribution of Marital Property Act,'2 the statute concerning the
effect of releases and covenants not to sue,' 3 and the Virginia
Stock Corporation Act.' 4 Professor Bryson, faithful to his first se-
lection criterion, will doubtless cast his net in these directions as
he prepares future volumes.' 5
Use of the first selection criterion (and its subsets) has another,
9. See 1 Va. Cir. preface (1985). Professor Bryson also labels errors in discovery and pro-
cedure as "harmless." Practitioners wounded in battle by such errors might take issue with
this label. But all would agree that many issues in these areas are never appealed for a
variety of reasons (e.g., appeal of discovery production order might require counsel to risk
contempt of court) and all would further agree that reporting decisions on these issues will,
in due course, help reduce errors.
10. It is perhaps worth recalling here an often-overlooked fact: not all federal district and
circuit court opinions are published. This practice of publishing selected opinions has pro-
voked controversy, much of it predictably focused on the selection criteria. See Reynolds &
Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DuKE L.J. 807; Reyn-
olds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation
Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUm. L. REV. 1167 (1978); Note, Unre-
ported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 128 (1977).
11. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1 to -195.8 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Supp. 1985).
12. Id. § 20-107.3 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Supp. 1985).
13. Id. § 8.01-35.1 (Repl. VoL 1984 & Supp. 1985).
14. Id. tit. 13.1, chs. 9-11 (Interim Supp. 1985).
15. Given the aim of the first selection criterion, Professor Bryson might also cast his net
in the direction of family law. Judges of the juvenile and domestic relations courts have an
expansive and important original jurisdiction, many aspects of which have never received
supreme court review. Thus, not infrequently they must wrestle with novel and difficult
legal issues. While they do not routinely write opinions, they occasionally do so. Some of
these may merit inclusion in the Opinions, as indeed some are occasionally cited by the
Virginia Supreme Court. See, e.g., Stephens v. Stephens, 229 Va. _, 1 VLR 1517, 1520
(1985).
1985]
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more subtle benefit that merits mention. Federal courts in diver-
sity suits must, in the absence of controlling state precedent, spec-
ulate as to what result the highest state court would reach. 16 While
circuit court opinions are not controlling in these circumstances,
federal courts sensitive to the demands of federalism properly re-
gard them as persuasive. By collecting and reporting circuit court
opinions on issues not covered by the supreme court, Professor
Bryson gives federalism a valuable assist.18
So much then for the first three selection criteria. They deserve
primary emphasis in this context. What then of the final crite-
rion-the selection of recent opinions on issues covered only by
nineteenth century Virginia Supreme Court authority? It is a valid
criterion for if such circuit court opinions exist, they serve notice
that the rule or principle, though old, still has vitality. But this
selection criterion, as Professor Bryson apparently recognizes, is of
only secondary importance. Furthermore, when utilized it should
be joined with its mate-circuit court opinions which reluctantly
follow, but are critical of, aged authority. Publication of these
opinions would alert the supreme court to a potential need for re-
examination of an issue, thereby also allowing circuit courts to play
an appropriately significant role in the dynamics of common law
development.
Professor Bryson's selection criteria are, if followed, well suited
to further the reporter's goals. By and large, I think he has suc-
16. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
17. See, e.g., Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1985)
(approval of district court's reliance in diversity case on Virginia circuit court opinions);
Harris v. Lukhard, 733 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1984) (in absence of controlling authority, federal
court in diversity case should afford weight to state lower court's interpretation of statute);
see also 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & F. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4507
(1982).
18. Of course, Virginia circuit judges may also miss the mark when they are required to
speculate, and this possibility suggests a way in which Professor Bryson can enhance the
utility of future volumes of Opinions. Since there is no Shepards for these circuit court
opinions, Professor Bryson should undertake to note in future volumes which, if any, of the
previously published opinions have been explicitly or implicitly overruled, modified or
criticized.
Another important service Professor Bryson could render to readers of future volumes is
the identification and perhaps discussion of conflicting opinions. Compare, e.g., McIntyre v.
McIntyre, 1 Va. Cir. 175 (Cir. Ct. of Henrico County 1975) (fifth amendment refusal to
answer deposition question seeking adultery admission treated as admission) with Gantt v.
Gantt, 1 Va. Cir. 266 (Cir. Ct. of City of Richmond 1982) (fifth amendment refusal to an-
swer interrogatory seeking admission of adultery deemed a denial).
[Vol. 19:881
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ceeded. It is no easy task. Virginia's judges and lawyers would ma-
terially aid Professor Bryson's important work if, as he requests,19
they send him opinions. And they should send him all opinions
from throughout the Commonwealth, allowing him to make the
sometimes subtle publication selection.20 In making these selection
decisions, too stringent an application of the selection criteria
should be avoided. Close cases should be decided in favor of publi-
cation. Indeed, I would urge his including some opinions not within
the selection criteria if they are particularly well-reasoned, well
written or otherwise exemplary. This, one hopes, would have the
salutary effect of encouraging circuit judges to issue written opin-
ions more often. 1 Written opinions certainly promote justice and
the almost equally important appearance of justice.22 A judge who
submits his or her decisional process to the discipline and rigor of
a writing illuminates for himself, as importantly as for others, the
sometimes obscure intellectual path to decision. A written opinion
is tangible, accountable evidence to litigants and the public that
the judge has engaged, or not engaged, the issues. Professor
Bryson's effort, if it encourages written opinions, will have served
the significant goal of judicial accountability.23
In summary, Professor Bryson has commenced a potentially im-
portant venture. Only time, future volumes, and the reaction of the
bench and bar can determine whether he will succeed. Let us hope
he does, for then we shall all benefit.
19. See 1 Va. Cir. preface (1985).
20. For a persuasive statement that the decision to publish should be unfettered and in-
dependent of the bench, see Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F. Supp. 137, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
The potential for publication discourages judges from producing opinions which are poorly
written or incorrectly reasoned.
21. An important constraint on a circuit judge's opinion-writing activity is the absence, in
some cases, of a full-time secretary and, in all cases, the absence of any law clerks. The
Judicial Council of Virginia and the Tides Inn Conference of the Virginia Bar Association
have endorsed state funding for both secretaries and law clerks. Those in sympathy with the
goals of Professor Bryson's Opinions must hope this recommendation finds favor.
22. The importance of appearances is too often underestimated. Lord Devlin, the British
jurist, put it well when he noted: "[T]he judge who gives the right judgment while appearing
not to do so may be thrice blessed in heaven, but on earth he is no use at all." P. DEVLIN,
THE JUDGE 3 (1981).
23. Opinions and other reporters can aid in this process by focusing critical attention on
appropriate circuit court opinions. Perhaps the Virginia Supreme Court, too, might more
often find appropriate occasions to do the same. In many circumstances, a written opinion
from the circuit court materially aids appellate review. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S.
191 (1972) (fifth circuit decision without opinion vacated and remanded because of unin-
formative record).
1985]

HARRISON ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION FOR VIRGINIA AND WEST
VIRGINIA. By George P. Smith, Jr. Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie
Company, 1985. 574 pages, $60.00.
Reviewed by Dennis L Belcher*
An estate planning and estate administration practice involves
many substantive areas of law. In addition to having to be familiar
with the rules concerning wills, the estate planner and estate ad-
ministrator must be familiar with the law governing federal income
taxation, estate and gift taxation, real property, corporations, and
fiduciary litigation. Although there are many treatises covering the
federal income, estate and gift tax rules applicable to estate plan-
ning and estate administration, this area of the law is dependent in
great part upon Virginia law.
In Virginia, there has been no comprehensive, up-to-date trea-
tise that is authoritative in the area of wills and estate administra-
tion. Lamb's Virginia Probate Practice was published almost
twenty years ago and is generally considered an excellent form
book. The recent publication by Messrs. Dorset and Brown, the
Virginia Probate Handbook is also an excellent form book, but is
written in general terms and is not intended to be helpful where
detailed research is required. The most authoritative treatise in
the area of Virginia wills and estate administration has been Har-
rison on Wills and Administration. Unfortunately, the last edition
was written in 1960, and much has changed in the last twenty-five
years. Fortunately for Virginia practitioners, the first volume of
Harrison has now been updated.
The first edition of Harrison on Wills and Administration was
written by the Honorable T.W. Harrison, a circuit court judge in
Virginia for many years. The author of the second edition is
George P. Smith, Jr., who proved to be a worthy substitute to
Judge Harrison. The first and second editions of Harrison con-
tained three volumes. This third edition will be expanded to four
volumes.
Volume One consists of fifteen chapters and covers intestate suc-
* Partner, McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1973, College of William
and Mary, J.D., 1976, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
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cession, dower and curtesy, the substantive areas of wills, and the
first steps in probate proceedings. Volume Two consists of Chap-
ters 16-25 and covers will construction, creditors' rights, and the
rights and duties of a personal representative. Volume Three con-
sists of Chapters 26-32 and covers accounting and distribution and
other related estate administration matters. Volume Four will con-
tain forms, a table of cases, a table of constitutions and statutes,
and the index.
Overall, Volume One maintains the integrity of the earlier edi-
tions of Harrison on Wills and Administration. The strengths of
Harrison are continued in this third edition of Volume One. It is
comprehensive, easy to read, accurate, and authoritative. Numer-
ous cases are cited that can be located in no other one treatise.
This reviewer also found that recent changes in the law appeared
to have been covered.
Although few in number, this reviewer did find some weaknesses
in Volume One. It would be helpful if each volume had its own
separate index. Also, it does not appear that there have been sig-
nificant deletions of discussion of old law. Discussion of old law is
helpful in understanding the area of wills, but the readability of
the treatise would have been better served by old law being in-
cluded in footnotes.
Overall, this reviewer found the third edition of Volume One of
Harrison on Wills and Administration to be a continuation of the
authoritative nature of the earlier editions. This reviewer is confi-
dent the author will be complimented and thanked by Virginia
practitioners for many years to come.
In his preface, the author repeated a quotation of Judge Brock-
enbrough Lamb in Judge Lamb's preface to Virginia Probate
Practice: "And if there is any reason at all for writing, this can
only be the hope that somebody may read what is written." This
reviewer is confident that what Mr. Smith has written will be read
and will be very helpful to the reader.
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